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RESPONSE
INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE AND
ORGANIZATIONAL PROSECUTIONS
Daniel Richman*

T

HE business pages regularly provide graphic stories about corporate deferred prosecution agreements (“DPAs”). And
commentators regularly fulminate about this alleged abuse of government power, quite confident (or willfully blind to the fact) that
the removal of this non-nuclear option from the prosecutorial arsenal would substantially lessen the ability of prosecutors to obtain
cooperation from firms and their employees. Yet this emerging
practice has received all too little scholarly attention, and Professor
Brandon Garrett has made an important contribution by carefully
examining the available facts and creatively drawing on the structure reform literature to highlight questions it raises about legiti1
macy and institutional competence.
That Garrett raises more questions than he answers merely highlights the richness of the topic he has so nicely limned. It would indeed be troubling if a decentralized corps of unelected federal
prosecutors, having cut their teeth on gun and drug cases, moved
into the corporate arena and used the threat of criminal prosecu*
Professor, Columbia Law School (as of July 1, 2007). The author also served as
Assistant United States Attorney and eventually Chief Appellate Attorney in the
Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney’s Office between 1987 and 1992.
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This essay is a response to Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93
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tion—often tantamount to corporate execution—to fiddle with
corporate structures and goals. But prosecutors rarely act alone,
and are unlikely to do so in a sustained white collar investigation.2
Of the DPAs Garrett studied, sixty-six percent were reached explicitly in conjunction with regulatory agencies3—with the SEC
leading the pack—and that figure might substantially understate
agency involvement, since an agency extensively consulted by
prosecutors might go unmentioned in the formal agreement.
To what extent did regulatory agencies shape the agreements
that prosecutors obtained with their assistance? Garrett’s uncertainty on this point is completely understandable, since an outside
observer would be hard pressed to know. But one cannot assess
the institutional competence issue without such data. To be sure,
finding that, say, regulatory agencies were using the strong norm
of prosecutorial discretion to circumvent political or legal restraints on their own power so as to, say, extract structural concessions that they would not themselves have been able to achieve
through rulemaking or adjudication, would raise questions about
legitimacy and accountability. The same sort of reservations one
might have about state and local criminal enforcers bringing cases
to federal prosecutors as a way around their state constitutions,
sentencing limitations, or intentional fiscal constraints might apply
here.4 For all the attention given to the supply side of the “overcriminalization” or “overfederalization” phenomenon that turns
what are “really” civil cases into criminal cases and what are
“really” state cases into federal cases,5 little attention has been
given to the demand side. On the other hand, extensive agency involvement would address competency concerns. And one might
2

See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 767–78 (2003).
3
Garrett, supra note 1, at 896.
4
See Phyllis J. Newton et al., Investigation and Prosecution of Homicide Cases in
the U.S.: The Process for Federal Involvement (2006), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/ pdffiles1/nij/grants/214753.pdf; Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 Crime & Just. 377, 401–02 (2006).
5
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 193 (1991);
Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 Emory L.J. 1533 (1997); Erik
Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 703 (2005); William
J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505 (2001).
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even celebrate the measure of cost internalization (or is it “capture”?) that the agencies would bring to prosecutorial decisionmaking.6
A determination that DPAs did not represent a collaboration
between regulators and prosecutors would return us to the competence problem, but would not itself demand the reconsideration of
our deferred prosecution practices. The answer—at least in those
cases arising within the remit of a regulatory agency—might instead lie in the reconsideration of the institutional design choices
and legal doctrines that keep criminal prosecutions and agency en7
forcement activity on separate (albeit parallel) tracks. Indeed, the
New York Attorney General’s Office’s ability to shift seamlessly
between criminal and civil tracks was critical to Eliot Spitzer’s ef8
fectiveness in that office. One need not embrace the elimination
of the institutional civil/criminal divide to recognize the beneficial
6

In a recent Senate hearing, a former senior Justice Department official gave his
recollection of internal discussions when, in the early 1990s, “an investigation produced substantial evidence that Salomon Brothers had misconducted itself in connection with the U.S. Treasury long bond market and that the impropriety was sponsored
at the highest levels of the company”:
A United States Attorney and his senior staff were highly desirous of undertaking a massive prosecution under the securities laws[,] a course of action that was
not without legal merit but which also would have ended up depriving the company of most of its assets and employees and ultimately closing it down. That
course had an analog in the earlier case of Drexel, Burnham. The Secretary of
the Treasury, however, strongly believed that while the management of Salomon brothers had to be removed, sanctioned and replaced, an early settlement
that would allow a restructured company to participate in the bond market, offering needed competition and financial stability, was greatly in the public interest. Ultimately this view prevailed, although the United States Attorney believed that his independence had been compromised.
Is the DOJ Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (prepared statement of the Hon. Stuart M. Gerson, Partner, Epstein Becker & Green), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2516&wit_id=6062.
7
See United States v. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (D. Or. 2006) (condemning the
government for improperly using an SEC investigation to gather evidence for a
criminal prosecution); United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (N.D. Ala. 2006)
(same).
8
See Brooke A. Masters, Spoiling for a Fight: The Rise of Eliot Spitzer 49–50
(2006) (noting that under New York’s Martin Act, Spitzer’s office “could subpoena
documents, haul brokers and investment bankers in for public questioning, and,
unlike his federal counterparts at the SEC and the Justice Department, he didn’t have
to specify up front whether he was going to seek criminal charges or file an easier-toprove civil case”).
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effects of tinkering with this traditional (and quite defensible)
separation.
Understanding the institutional arrangements underlying DPAs
might make us a lot more comfortable with the doctrinal lacunae
within which such agreements operate. And the regulatory gap
might not be as large as Garrett suggests.9 While it is true that
DPAs explicitly leave the government with extraordinary discretion when it comes to judging whether an organization has complied, one would not expect prosecutors to act arbitrarily when alleging breach, at least if they would like future defendants to
consider entering into such agreements. Although proof on this
point is hard to come by, such reputational bonding seems to play
an important role in ensuring that prosecutors do not arbitrarily
renege on cooperation agreements with individuals.10 It likely plays
an even bigger role in corporate prosecutions (or nonprosecutions)
because of the cohesiveness of the white collar defense bar. Until
we get a handle on the nature and extent of this restraint, I would
hold off on Garrett’s proposal for legislation allowing early judicial
review of prosecutorial claims of breach.
A final institutional issue involves the role that Garrett envisions
Washington playing vis-à-vis U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. There is
some evidence that the Justice Department’s commitment to white
collar enforcement has been flagging in recent days. Its leaders,
particularly soon-to-be former Deputy Attorney General Paul
McNulty, have made a sustained (but unappreciated) effort to mollify corporate critics of Department policies.11 FBI agents reportedly have been transferred from white collar to counterterrorism
and other programs.12 And the emerging story of U.S. Attorney fir9

Garrett, supra note 1, at 930–31.
See Daniel Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 69, 109–10 (1995).
11
See DOJ’s McNulty: Level of Waiver Requests Doesn’t Justify Bill to Limit
Agency Discretion, 81 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 86 (Apr. 25, 2007); Jessica Guynn, Feds
Reduce Pressure in White-Collar Probes: Now Companies Will Often be Able to Offer Counsel, S.F. Chron., Dec. 13, 2006, at D2.
12
Jason McLure, White Collar Prosecutions Dropping: The Wave of White-Collar
Prosecutions May Have Crested, Legal Times, July 17, 2006 (“[B]y some measures
the crackdown on corporate criminals has stalled”); Paul Shukovsky et al., The FBI’s
Terrorism Trade-Off: Focus on National Security After 9/11 Means that the Agency
has Turned its Back on Thousands of White-Collar Crimes, Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
Apr. 11, 2007, at A1; but see Audit Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Audit Report 05-37,
The External Effects of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Reprioritization Efforts
10
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ings suggest that high-ranking Department officials were far more
likely to question, or punish, U.S. Attorneys for insufficient efforts
in firearm, immigration, drug, and obscenity cases than for any
slack in the white collar area.13 With memories of Enron fading,
and the political gains from a sustained commitment in corporate
crime always uncertain, some variant of these developments might
well have happened in any of the recent administrations. Those
who prefer a fair degree of zeal in white collar enforcement should
therefore think twice before counseling more centralized control
over DPAs and, for that matter, corporate privilege waivers.14
I suppose that in theory, one could envision the Justice Department presiding over a lovely experimentalist regime in which the
“informal exchange of information amongst independent monitors,
prosecutors, regulators, and industry experts will, over time, create
a narrowed set of accepted best remedial practices.”15 Figuring out
what “works”—that is, how to measure compliance—is not just a
technical challenge here, however. It is a fundamental confounding
problem in the whole area of white collar enforcement.16 Should a
whistleblower, victim, or other source tell us of new misconduct in
a firm with what was thought to have been a rigorous (or lax) compliance regime, we will have some data. Should a trusted monitor
53 (2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0537/final.pdf (noting
that the “FBI designated corporate fraud as its top national priority for financial
crimes and has increased the number of agents handling those matters between [fiscal
years] 2000 and 2004. Case management data from the [U.S. Attorneys’ Offices] also
demonstrated the FBI’s increased emphasis on corporate fraud matters, showing that
the FBI had referred more matters to [those Offices] during [fiscal year] 2004 than it
had during [] 2000.”).
13
See Kelly Thornton & Onell R. Soto, Lam is asked to step down; Job performance said to be behind White House firing, San Diego Union-Tribune, Jan. 12, 2007,
at A1 (suggesting that San Diego U.S. Attorney was asked to resign because of her
focus on white collar and public corruption cases at the expense of immigration and
gun cases).
14
See Daniel Richman, Decisions About Coercion: The Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege Waiver Problem, 57 DePaul L. Rev (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=968469.
15
Garrett, supra note 1, at 935.
16
See Corporate Fraud Task Force, Second Year Report to the President (2004),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/2nd_yr_fraud_report.pdf; see also Daniel C.
Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 583, 613–14 (2005) (discussing
challenge of finding adequate performance measures for federal white collar enforcement efforts).
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tell us that no misconduct has occurred on her beat, we would have
more, but not much certainty about its quality. We will certainly
hear from firms about compliance’s heavy costs and of their consequent loss of competitiveness. But they have every reason to overestimate both of these. Finding appropriate performance metrics is
hard enough for those engaged in (or opposing) structural reform
in prisons, schools, or other such institutions. In the white collar
area, the challenge may be insurmountable. Garrett is quite right,
though, to suggest that we try a lot harder. And perhaps we can
even hope that a robust compliance market—involving law firms,
compliance firms, and the like—will emerge that is more than window dressing or a protection racket.
Preferred citation: Daniel Richman, Institutional Competence
and Organizational Prosecutions, 93 Va. L. Rev. In Brief 115 (2007),
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/06/18/richman.pdf.

